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Electricity market design requires tools that result in a better understanding of incentives of 
generators and consumers. Chapter 1 and 2 provide tools and applications of these tools to 
analyze incentive problems in electricity markets. 
In chapter 1, models of supply function equilibrium (SFE) with asymmetric bidders are studied. I 
prove the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in an asymmetric SFE model. In addition, I 
propose a simple algorithm to calculate numerically the unique equilibrium. As an application, a 
model of investment decisions is considered that uses the asymmetric SFE as an input. In this 
model, firms can invest in different technologies, each characterized by distinct variable and fixed 
costs. 
In chapter 2, option contracts are introduced to a supply function equilibrium (SFE) model. The 
uniqueness of the equilibrium in the spot market is established. Comparative statics results on the 
effect of option contracts on the equilibrium price are presented. A multi-stage game where 
option contracts are traded before the spot market stage is considered. When contracts are 
optimally procured by a central authority, the selected profile of option contracts is such that the 
spot market price equals marginal cost for any load level resulting in a significant reduction in 
cost. If load serving entities (LSEs) are price takers, in equilibrium, there is no trade of option 
contracts. Even when LSEs have market power, the central authority’s solution cannot be 
implemented in equilibrium. 
In chapter 3, we consider a game in which a buyer must repeatedly procure an input from a set of 
firms. In our model, the buyer is able to sign long term contracts that establish the likelihood with 
which the next period contract is awarded to an entrant or the incumbent. We find that the buyer 
finds it optimal to favor the incumbent, this generates more intense competition between 
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A- Optimal mechanism 
 
B- Eroding price contract: 
 
C- Second price auction: 
 




